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Abstract. We here establish an upper bound on the probability for
deviations of a Markov population process from its mean-ﬁeld approximation.
The population consists of n distinct subpopulations of equal size N,w h e r e
each subpopulation is associated with a player role in a ﬁnite n-player game.
At discrete times t =0 ,1/N, 2/N, ... one individual is drawn at random from
the total population to review his or her pure strategy choice. We allow transi-
tion probabilities to depend smoothly on population size N and show that the
probability bound converges exponenially to zero as N →∞ . This generalizes
ar e s u l ti nB e n a ¨ ım and Weibull (2003).
Many population models in game theory hypothesize a continuum of interacting
agents and describe the evolutionary selection process in terms of a system of ordinary
diﬀerential equations. These equations usually concern changes in population shares
associated with the diﬀerent pure strategies in the game, and the changes are viewed
as aggregates of large numbers of individual strategy switches. In this so-called mass-
action interpretation, due to Nash (1950), individuals are randomly and recurrently
drawn to review their own choice of pure strategy, and mixed strategies are popula-
tion distributions over pure strategies, rather than randomizations implemented by
individual players. This population model was not formalized by Nash (1950), but
dynamic population models later emerged in evolutionary biology. Prime examples
are diﬀerent versions of the replicator dynamics, see Taylor and Jonker (1978), Taylor
(1979) and Maynard Smith (1982). For wide classes of such population dynamics,
results have been obtained that establish connections with non-cooperative concepts
such as dominance, Nash equilibrium and strategic stability (see, e.g. Weibull (1995)).
∗Our research was supported by the Swiss National Foundation Grant 200020-120218 and by the






































9Mean-ﬁeld approximation of stochastic population processes in games 2
An important question for the relevance of these results is whether these dynamics
are good approximations of the stochastic population processes that arise from indi-
vidual strategy revision in ﬁnite but large populations. In an earlier study, Bena¨ ım
and Weibull (2003), we addressed this question and established approximation re-
sults under the hypothesis that switching rates do not depend on population size.
However, robustness in this respect is desirable, since in applications switching prob-
abilities may well, to some extent, depend on population size, see Fudenberg et al.
(2006), Fudenberg and Imhof (2008) and Example 1 below.1 In this note, we gen-
eralize our previous result to allow for such dependence on population size.2 To the
best of our knowledge, the present result is the most general and powerful approxima-
tion for this class of Markov chains, giving an exponential upper bound on deviation
probabilities in bounded time intervals, a bound that permits asymptotic analysis by
way of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma.3 The present generalization is obtained by ﬁrst
establishing a result for the stochastic process’ deviations from its ﬁnite-population
mean-ﬁeld ﬂow, before going to its deviation from its limit mean-ﬁeld ﬂow.
1. A class of stochastic processes
Consider a ﬁnite n-player game with player roles i ∈ I = {1,...n}, ﬁnite pure strategy











and polyhedron ¤(S)=×i∆(Si) of mixed-strategy proﬁles x =( x1,...,xn). The
polyhedron ¤(S)i st h u sas u b s e to fRm,f o rm =
P
i mi. For each player role i there
is a subpopulation consisting of N individuals. Each individual is at every moment
in time associated with a pure strategy in her strategy set. An individual in pop-
ulation i who is associated with pure strategy h ∈ Si is called an h-strategist.A t
times t ∈ T = {0,δ,2δ,...},w h e r eδ =1 /N, and only then, exactly one individual
has the opportunity to change his or her pure strategy. This individual is randomly
drawn, with equal probability for all nN individuals, and with statistical indepen-
dence between successive draws. With this ﬁxed relationship between population size
and period length, the expected time interval between two successive draws of one
1We are grateful to Drew Fudenberg for raising this issue.
2We also take the opportunity to correct a mistake in the statement of Lemma 1 in our previous
paper. The statement should be “For every T>0 there exists...”, see Proposition 1 below. We are
grateful to Sergiu Hart for spotting the mistake.
3For other stochastic approximation results, see Kurtz (1981), Benveniste et al. (1990), Duﬂo





































9Mean-ﬁeld approximation of stochastic population processes in games 3
and the same individual is n, independently of the population size N.W e w i l l c a l l
the times t ∈ T transition times - the only times when a transition can take place.




t∈T be a Markov chain, with ﬁnite state space
¤N(S), deﬁned as follows. First, ¤N(S) is the subset (“grid”) of points x ∈ ¤(S)
such that Nxih is a nonnegative integer for each i ∈ I and h ∈ Si. Secondly, for
every player role i and pair (h,k) ∈ S2
i of pure strategies for that role, there exists a
continuous function phN
ik : ¤(S) → [0,1] such that phN























ik (x)( 2 )
for all i ∈ I, h,k ∈ Si, N ∈ N and x ∈ ¤N(S). Here phN
ik (x) is the conditional prob-
ability, given the current population state x,t h a tak-strategist in player population
i will be drawn for strategy revision and switch to pure strategy h. Thus, for any
















ik (x)i f vi = eh
i − ek
i and vj =0∀j 6= i
0o t h e r w i s e
For any player role i ∈ I and pure strategy h ∈ Si, and any population size N,
the expected net increase in the subpopulation of h-strategists, from one transition













ih (x). ( 3 )
It follows from the probability speciﬁcation above that FN




ih(x) ≡ 0a n dFN
ih(x) ≥ 0i fxih = 0. We view each function FN as a
mapping from E to E,w h e r eE = RM,f o rM = m − n, is the tangent space of the
polyhedron ¤(S).4 We assume that every function FN,f o rN ∈ N, is bounded and
locally Lipschitz continuous, that there for every compact set C ⊂ E exists a common
Lipschitz constant λ for all functions FN, and, moreover, that FN → F uniformly.
Then also F is bounded and locally Lipschitz continuous.
We are interested in deterministic continuous-time approximation of Markov chains
XN in the class deﬁned above, when the population size N is large, and thus the time
interval δ =1 /N between successive transition times is short. The key element for
such approximation is the vector ﬁeld FN : E → E deﬁned above, which, for short
4Recall that ¤(S) is the Cartesian product of n unit simplices, ∆(Si), and that the latter is a
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time intervals, gives the expected net increase in each population share during the
time interval, per time unit.5 The associated system of mean-ﬁeld equations,
˙ xih = F
N
ih(x) ∀i ∈ I,h∈ Si,x∈ E (4)
deﬁne this limiting dynamic. In force of the Picard-Lindel¨ of Theorem, the system (4)
of ﬁrst-order ordinary diﬀerential equations has a unique solution through every point
x in E (see, e.g., Hale (1969)). Moreover, as noted above, the sum of all population
shares in each population remains constant over time, and no population share can
turn negative. Hence, the system of equations (4) deﬁnes a solution mapping ξN :
R × ¤(S) → E that leaves each mixed-strategy simplex ∆(Si), and hence also the
polyhedron ¤(S) of mixed-strategy proﬁles, invariant. In other words, the system of
diﬀerential equations determines a solution for all times t ∈ R, and if the initial state
is in ¤(S), then also all future states are in ¤(S).6 We will call ξN the ﬂow induced
by FN. Similarly, let ξ be the ﬂow induced by the limit vector ﬁeld F.
Let ||·||∞ denote the L∞-norm on E = RM.T h e n|| ˆ XN(t)−ξN(t,x)||∞ represents
the deviation of the interpolated Markov chain from the deterministic approximation




N(t,x)||∞ =m a x
i∈I,h∈Si














is thus the maximal deviation in any population share, from the ﬂow induced by FN
through x, during a bounded time interval [0,T].





N(t) − ξ(t,x)||∞ (7)
is the maximal deviation in any population share, from the ﬂow ξ induced by F
through x, during the same time interval.
Example 1. Suppose that (a) every individual has the same probability of being
drawn for strategy revision, (b) the revising individual draws another individual in his
5There are N transition times per time unit and N individuals in each player population.
6More exactly: ξ(0,x)=x for all x, ∂
∂tξih(t,x)=Fih [ξ(t,x)] for all i, h, x and t,a n dξi(t,x) ∈
∆(Si) for all i ∈ I, x ∈ ¤(S), and t ∈ R. The time domain of the solution mapping ξ can be taken
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or her own player subpopulation, and (c) depending on the information then available
about her own and the other individual’s payoﬀs, imitates the other individual. Then













ik (x) is the conditional imitation probability from pure strategy k to pure
strategy h.I fa l lf u n c t i o n sqh



















so all functions FN are bounded, have a common Lipschitz constant, and converge
uniformly to the function F deﬁned by setting 1/N =0in this formula.
2. Mean-field approximation of DN
N(T,x)
Let Uk,f o rk ∈ N, be the diﬀerence between the step taken by the Markov chain XN

















. The following result provides a useful upper
bound on the diﬀerence Uk.L e th.,.i denote the inner product in the tangent space of
the polyhedron of mixed-strategy proﬁles: hx,yi =
PM
i=1 xiyi for any vectors x,y ∈ E.






















Let g(t)=l o gE(ethθ,Uki|Fk). The function g : R → R is convex and satisﬁes g(0) =
g0(0) = 0, g00(t) ≤ ||θ||2
2ΓN. Therefore g(1) ≤ ||θ||2
2ΓN/2.
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Lemma 2. For every T>0 there exists a scalar c>0 such that, for any ε>0,a n d









−ε2cN ∀x ∈ ¤
N(S)
Proof. In order to prove this, let λN be the Lipschitz constant of FN on the
compact set ¤(S) ⊂ E, with respect to the L∞-norm, let k·k2 denote the L2-norm,
and let
° °FN° °
2 be the maximum of
° °FN (x)
° °
2 on ¤(S). Let Uk,f o rk ∈ N,b ea s
deﬁned above, and let U : R+ → E be the map deﬁned by U(t)=Uk for kδ ≤ t<
(k +1 ) δ. Likewise, let ¯ XN be the continuous-time (right-continuous) step process
generated by the Markov chain XN: ¯ XN(t)i sd e ﬁned for all t ∈ R+ by ¯ XN(t)=
XN(kδ)f o rkδ ≤ t<(k +1 ) δ. Suppose that XN(0) = x ∈ ¤(S). Then
ˆ X






















Since ξN(t,x) − x =
R t

















U(s)ds||∞ .( 1 2 )







N(t,x)||∞ ≤ [Ψ(T)+2 δλNT]e
λNT .( 1 3 )
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.( 1 6 )
Let u1,...,u M be the canonical basis of E = RM, ε>0, and u = ±ui for some i.S e t





























































Hence, the claim in the lemma holds for any c ∈ (0,γ), where










3. Mean-field approximation of DN(T,x)
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N(t,x)||∞ <ε / 2
for all N ≥ Nε. Hence, by the Triangle Inequality, for such N,t h ee v e n t
AN =
©
ω ∈ Ω : D






ω ∈ Ω : D
N
N(T,x) ≥ ε/2 | X
N(0) = x
ª
that is, AN ⊂ BN, and hence Pr(AN) ≤ Pr(BN). Our main result follows immedi-
ately from Lemma 2 above:
Proposition 1. For every T>0 there exists a scalar c>0 such that, for any ε>0,








−ε2cN ∀x ∈ ¤
N(S).
Remark 1. The claim holds for any c ∈ (0,γ/4),w h e r eγ>0 is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n
(21).
Remark 2. It is easily veriﬁed that propositions 1-5 in Bena¨ ım and Weibull (2003)
hold also under the new, weaker hypothesis.
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